Civil Action No. 84-3040 Defendant\u27s Memorandum on Issues for Remedial Phase Trial by United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Hollins University 
Hollins Digital Commons 
Ann B. Hopkins Papers Manuscript Collections 
2-1-1988 
Civil Action No. 84-3040 Defendant's Memorandum on Issues for 
Remedial Phase Trial 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/hopkins-papers 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)




v. ) Civi1 Action No. 84-3040
) (Gesel1, J.)




DEFENDANT S MEMORANDUM ON ISSUES
FOR REMEDIAL PHASE T IAL
Theodore B. Olson #367456
Wayne A. Schrader #361111
Larry L. Simms #223305
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
Suite 900






Table of Authorities .................. ii, iii
I. Introduction . .   ....... 1
II. The Court Of Appeals Did Not
Determine The Nature Of The
Relief To Which Plaintiff
Is Entitle  ........   ..... 1
III. Liability An  Remedy Are Discreet
Segments Of Title VII Litigation ........ 2
IV. A Full Reme ial Phase Trial Is The
Only Fair, Just And Workable  Further
Procee ing" Which May Be Had In
This Case       4
V. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled To An Award
Of A Price  aterhouse Partnership ....... 8
VI. If The Court Were Inclined To Order
Relief Beyon  Reconsideration,
Front Pfiy Would Be More Appropriate
Than An  Or er Requiring Plaintiff ' s
Admission To The Partnership .......... 12
VII. This Court Must Consider Plaintiff's
Failure To Mitigate Damages In
Fashioning Any Economic Award ......... 13
VIII. Conclusion .   ......... 13
i
TABLE OF AUTHO ITIES
PAGE
Albermarle Paper Company v, Moody.
422 U.S. 405 (1974)   .......... 3
Bibbs v. Block. 778 F.2d 1318
(8th Cir. 1985)     . 10
Darnell v. City of Jasper.
730 F. 2d 653 (11th Cir. 1 84)   11
Day v. Mathews. 530 F.2d 1083
(D.C. Cir. 1976)   ........... 4
Fields v. Clark University. 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
670 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd. 817 F.2d 931
(1st Cir. 1987) ..................  
Gemmell v. Meese, 655 F. Supp. 577
(E.D. Pa. 1986) . . .     11
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F. 2  1115
(3rd Cir. 1980)     11
Hishon v. Kin  & Spal ing,
476 U.S. 69j (1984)   12
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse. 618 F. Supp.
1109' (D.D.C. 1985)   9,11
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse. 825 F,2d 458
(D.C. Cir. 1987)      . 1,2
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 325 (1977) ........ 3,4,10
Johnson v. Brock. 810 F.2  219
(D.C. Cir. 1987)     3,4
MiIton v. Weinber er. 696 F.2d 94
(D.C. Cir. 1982)     2
Mt. Healthy City School District v. Dovle.
429 U.S. 274 (1977)   10
Pvo v. Stockton State Colle e.
603 F. Sup . 1278
(D.N.J. 1985) ................... 11
PAGE
Smith v. Secretary of Navy,
659 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ......... . 2,3
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp.,




This matter has been remanded by the Court of Appeals
with instructions that this Court "conduct further proceedings
in order to  etermine the appropriate relief." Hopkins v
Price Waterhouse. 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir, 1987). Because
it is not clear from the Court of Appeals decision what
"further proceedings" should be conducte , this Court has asked
the parties to provide guidance concerning that issue, This
memorandum responds to the Court's request, sets forth the
reasons  hy, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
only "appropriate  "further proceedings" must be a trial on all
aspects of the remedial  ortion of this Title VII case, and
ex lains why plaintiff is entitled neither to admission to
artnership in  efendant nor damages calculated on the basis of
admission to partnership.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DETERMINE THE NATURE OF
THE RELIEF TO WHICH PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
The Court of Appeals affir ed this Court's fin ing in
plaintiff's favor on liability an  overturned this Court's
conclusion that plaintiff had not been constructively
discharged. However, the Court of Appeals  id not otherwise
purport to resolve any aspect of the remedial phase of this
litigation. Indeed, while the Court of Appeals  ecision is not
altogether free of a biguity, that Court could not have decided
the remedial segment of plaintiff's case because the Court of
Appeals found that, "without the knowledge or consent of the
[District] Court," the parties had "attempted to bifurcate the
trial and postpone consi eration of the issue of damages."
825 F.2d at 472. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had no
choice but to remand the case to this Court for "further
procee ings" which would, in turn, allow this Court to
" eter ine the a pro riate relief." Id¦ at 473. In essence,
although sympathetic to the inconv nience to the District Court
caused by the  arties' unsanctioned effort to bifurcate, the
Court of Appeals apparently determined that the evidence which
plaintiff had refrained from presenting regarding remedial
issues at the first trial coul  and should be offere  at a
remedial phase trial on remand. It follows as a matter of
logic, fairness  an  due process, that defendant shoul 
similarl  be permitted at the remedial phase trial to put on
all of its evidence regarding any issue relevant to remedy.
Ill
LI BILITY  ND REMEDY ARE DISCREET SEGMENTS
OF TITLE VII LITIGATION
The Court of Ap eals for this Circuit has deter ine 
that "a plaintiff whose ri ht to protection from discrimination
has been violated still may be denie  a full remedy." Milton
v. Weinber er, 696 F.2d 94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court's
e phasis) (citing S ith v. Secretary of Navy. 659 F.2d 1113,
2 -
1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Thus, the Court of Appeals has
recently observed, "in Title VII cases 'the questions of
statutory violation and appropriate statutory reme y are
conceptually distinct.'" Johnson v, Brock. 810 F.2  219, 223
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Smith v. Secretary of Navy, supra. at
1120).
The remedial phase of a Title VII case is an
essentially equitable procee ing. As the Supreme Court has
observe , in a Title VII case there a re no:
"automatic or man atory remed[ies] ....
The [statutory] scheme i plicitly recognizes
that there may be cases calling for one
re edy but not another, and , . . these
choices are of course, left in the first
instance to the  istrict courts."
Albermarle Paper Co pany v. Moody, 422 U.5. 405, 415-416
(1974) .
In commenting on the equitable considerations that may
inform the trial court in formulating relief, the Supreme Court
has observed that:
Especially when im ediate imple entation of
an equitable re ed  threatens to impinge
upon the e pectations of innocent parties,
the court  ust "look to the practical
realities and necessities inescapably
involved in reconciling competing
interests," in order to determine the
"special blend of what is necessary, what is
fair, and what is workable."
International Brotherhood of Tea sters v. United States, 431
U.S. 325, 375 (1977) (citations omitted).
3 -
Where a plainti££ .has established that an em loyment
decision has been affecte  in some manner by prohibite 
iscrimination, as has been determine  here, the employer may
nonetheless avoid the reme ies o£ back-pay an  instatement by
emonstrating with clear an  convincing evi ence in the
reme ial phase of the case that the promotion  ecision woul 
have been the same even absent  iscrimination, Johnson 
Brock, SUEra. St 224 (citing Daz JathewS. 530 F.2  1083,
1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). In fact, the  clear an  convincing
proof require ent of Day comes into play only aft r the
a.    •   ai-utorv violation." JQhnson_v laintiff has established a statutory vxu.|.a
Brock, idj.
as these authorities  emonstrate, the reme ial phase
of a Title VII case properly inclu es consideration of all
evidence and  argument on any issue, inclu ing whether the
employment  ecision woul  have been the same absent any
prohibited  iscrimination, relevant to "what is necessary, what
is fair, and  hat is workable." IntlLrnaUonalJr 
T msters v. United_States, supra, at 375,
IV
WHTCH MAY BE HAD IN_THIS_CASE
hile the precise parameters of the bifurcatron
intended by the parties were never reduced to writing and
submitte  to this Cour , the only reasonable, fair an 
practicable course from this point is to proceed with a full
4
trial of all remedial phase issues  Such an approach is
consistent  ith the manner in which the parties proceede  in
the previous trial. While the references by counsel during the
previous trial were not unifor  regarding t e scope an  nature
of the intende  bifurcation, plaintiff's counsel characterize 
the agreement as bifurcation of the questions of re edy and
relief :
MR. HELLER I
We informally agree  to bifurcate  he case,
your honor, so you did not hear some of  he
economic facts ....
* 4c * A
We simply have not gone into the question of
remed  ....
Transcript, May 29, 1985, at p. 25
We were not getting into the question of
remedy and relief ....
Id. at 27.
The trial recor , taken as a whole, reflects that
plaintiff presented her case as if the entire remedial phase
was being  eferred, offerin  no evi ence or argument on any
reme ial issue. Defen an , of course, responded to plaintiff's
case on liability, but did no  attempt to respond to a
non-existent plain iff's case on reme ial issues.
Unfortunately, the parties' informal and un ritten
understan ing regarding this proce ure was not submitted for
the trial court s approval, bu  that does not alter the
fundamental fact that there has been a trial on liability, but
not on remedies.
5
The briefs of the plaintiff at the Court of Appeals
observed that the trial below had focused only  on the issue of
liability." Orig. Br. for Appellant-Cross Appellee at 20; Rep.
Br. for Appellant-Cross Appellee at 37. In fact, the only
reference to reme ial issues in the briefs submitted to the
trial court is the statemen  in note 1 of Defen ant's
Post-Trial Brief that plaintiff's failure to establish a
constructive disc arge claim would cut off her reme ial
rights. Significantly, plaintiff respon e  to that footnote by
accusing Pr ce Waterhouse of inviting the "Court to
preju ge . . . the relief to be given plaintiff . . . ."
Plaintiff's [Post-Trial] Rep. Br. at 10 n.l. Plaintiff s
reaction, of course, was. entirely consistent with her co nsel's
re resentation to the Court during  ost-trial arguments that
the parties hadjagreed "not to [get] into the question of
reme y an  relief . . . .    (Transcript of Post-Trial Argument
a  26-27).
Price Waterhouse acknowledges that this Court
previously foc se  on some aspects of certain issues which
overlap with considerations relevant to the'remedial phase of
this litigation, including the question whether the defendant
woul  have " eld  plaintiffs partnership can i acy absent any
unconscious se  stereoty ing. However, the Court  id so
despite the fact that neither party at empted to present
evidence on t e reme ial phase issues because of their working
presumption concerning the bifurcation of liability an 
remedy. While this Cour   ay well be justifiably disturbed by
6
the  rospect of revisiting territory already partially
travelle , thereby implicitly giving effect to the unsanctioned
agreement between the parties, that seems  o be the only
reasonable course given the decision by and the directions from
the Court of Appeals. Any other approach would be unfair to
one or the other of the  arties.
Plaintiff may contend that previous consideration by
this Court of matters relevant to remedial issues requires that
those mat ers be foreclose  from further inquiry. Ho ever,
plaintiff un oubtedly intends to offer evidence and argument on
all aspec s of the remedies which she seeks,  hether or not
consi ered previously by the Court. It would be unfair and
unjust for  his Court to treat plaintiff as having reserved
entirely her evidence and argument as to reme ial issues an 
yet preclu e Ppice Waterhouse fro  offering any evidence which
it may have to any reme y sought by plaintiff.
The importance to the  efendant of having the
opportunity to present evidence on all relevant reme ial
issues, inclu ing whe her its decision "holding" plaintiff
would have been the sa e absent any alleged sex s ereotyping,
is underscored  y the  anner and timing of the intro uction of
that theory in this case by plaintiff. That theory was not
i entifie  before trial in plaintiff's discovery responses,
despite a clear request that she i entify the bases an  facts
upon which she asserte  her claim of sex  iscrimination.
Indeed, the se  stereo ype theory and plaintiff s e pert on
7
that theory  ere not identifie  until eleven days before trial,
after the close of discovery, and the expert was not made
available for deposition. Neither the sex stereo ype theory
nor the plai tiff's expert was even even introduced into  his
case until after plaintiff had completed her case-in-chief an 
the defendant had respon e  to it. The theory was then
introduce  (over  efendant's objection, Transcript at 539) as
supposed rebuttal. Under these circumstances, in the conte t
of the agree -upon bifurcation,  efen ant had no appropriate
opportunity in the liabilit  phase trial to present the "same
ecision" defense.
In summary, because of the unique circumstances
present in this case, as a result of the unwritten and
unsanctioned bifurcation agreement which precluded the full an 
orderly presentation of evidence regarding remedial issues, and
in light of the - ecision of the Court of Ap eals to re-open the
remedial phase of this case to enable plaintiff to offer
evidence not presente  before, the only just and fair proce ure
to pursue now is a full an  complete trial of all remedial
issues.
V
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
A PRICE WATERHOUSE PARTNERSHIP
Irrespective of the outcome of the "same decision"
efense in the remedial phase of this trial, plaintiff is not
entitled to an or er that Price Waterhouse make her a partner.
8 -
Such an order would constitute an extraordinary reme y, well
beyond the creation of a simple employment relationship. It
would directly, substantially an  intimately affect the
interests of individuals who plainly di  not discriminate
against plaintiff. It would be particularly inappropriate to
force Price Waterhouse par ners to acce t plaintiff into a
professional and collegial partnership relations ip under the
circumstances of this case. As this Court expressly foun ,
Price Waterhouse had strong and legitimate non-pretex ua1
reasons not to bind their future and share unlimited
liabilities with the  laintiff.
Inability to get along with staff or peers
is a legitimate, non iscriminatory reason
for refusing to a mit a candidate for
partnership.
j
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse. 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C.
1985) .
Under the circu stances, this Court, in the exercise
of its equitable discretion, shoul  not force plaintiff into
defen ant s partnership.
Plaintiff's Memorandum on Relief mistakenly assumes
that because liability has been established in her favor, she
as a legal entitlement to certain remedies, including back pay
and a mission to the Price Waterhouse partnership. However, as
noted earlier, this Court must exercise equitable powers  hen
selecting a remed  an  no remedy is auto atic. The obligation
imposed on this Court by Title VII is to exercise judgment an 
9
discretion, to consider "what is necessary, what is fair, and
what is workable" (International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, supra, at 375), and to administer justice.
This Cour 's responsibility certainly  oes not extend
beyond placing plaintiff in the position she would  ave been in
ha  impermissible ingre ients not seepe  into the unconscious
hemispheres of the partnership candi acy process. The fin ings
of the Court establish no more than that if that process had
been entirely free of sex stereotyping, plaintiff would have
been in the position of a candidate evaluated without regar  to
her sex. That is the most favorable position to which she may
be restored by any remedial or er of this Court. Plaintiff is
not entitle  to be place  in a more favorable position than she
would have occupied absent the "taint" of sex stereotyping. In
fact. Title VII, specifically provides that a plaintiff cannot
rely upon mere proof of some undefined "taint" in a multi-stage
decision process to achieve a more favorable position than she
woul  have been in had there been no taint of  iscrimination.
See, e.g,, Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc). See also Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
In similar cases, in which a  laintiff has been held
to ha e established that discrimination had some elusive an 
unquantifiable connection with a promotion decision, but  he
employer had also establishe  legiti ate reasons to question
- 10
the qualification of the plaintiff for the promotion in
question, the plaintiff has been given no more than
reconsideration for the  romotion in a nondiscriminatory
selection process. As in the instant case, many of these cases
have involved multi-stage decisional processes and promotions
which inclu e elements of tenure. See Gurmankin v, Costanzo.
626 F.2d 1115 (3r  Cir. 1980); Pvo v. Stockton State College.
603 F. Sup . 1278 (D.N.J. 1985); Gemmel1 v. Meese. 655 F. Supp.
577 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Fields v. Clark University. 40 Fair E pl.
Prac. Gas. 670 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir.
1987) . See also Darnell v. City of Jasper. 730 F,2d 653, 656
(11th Cir. 1984) (successful plaintiff entitled to take test
unlawfully  enied, but not to instatement to position).
The situation here is similar to the circu stances of
the foregoing gases. Plaintiff has establis e  no more than
that an impermissible element played an unquantified and
clearly not  ispositive role in a multi-step (multiple
evaluator) promotion selection process. The Court found that
many of the partners participating in that process offered
legiti ate non iscriminatory reasons why the plaintiff should
not receive the promotion she sought. This Court ex ressed
serious concern as to plaintiff * s interpersonal behavior and
thus her qualifica ion for the pro otion. This Court di  not
find that  laintiff "woul  have been elected to partnership if
the Policy Boar 's decision ha  not been tainted by se ually
biase  evaluations." 618 F. Supp. at 1120. Under the
- 11
circumstances, plaintiff can properly hope to recover nothing
more than an  untainted" evaluation of her partnership merits.
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 476 U.S. 69 (1984),  he
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in these types of cases is
simply entitled to be considered for partnership on
non iscriminatory bases. The Court did not hold that Title VII
rovides a plaintiff  ith a right to be admitted  o an 
participate in a partnershi . Under the circumstances, an
order by this Court directing that Price Waterhouse admit
laintiff to the partnership would go beyond the scope of the
Hishon  ecision.
VI
IF THE COURT WERE INCLINED TO ORDER RELIEF BEYOND
RECONSIDERATION. FRONT PAY WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE
THAN AN ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF'S ADMISSION
TO THE PARTNERSHIP
Even if this Court were inclined to or er relief
beyond reconsideration for  artnershi , it must confront the
issue of w ether front pay would be a more appropriate form of
relief than an order that plaintiff be a mitte  to the
partnershi . In light of the rights of the partners of Price
Waterhouse to exclude from the partnership persons like t e
laintiff, who are unable to fu ction well with employees and
colleagues, and who have engendere  antagonism and hostility, a
damage remedy is vastly preferable to an enforced partnership.




THIS COURT MUST CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO MITIGATE
DAMAGES IN FASHIONING ANY ECONOMIC AWARD
I  fashioning any award of back or front pay, this
Court  ill need to consider plaintiff's obligation to mitigate
damages and the evidence which defendant offers on that issue.
Discovery will be necessary on this matter and Price Waterhouse
intends to a dress the question whether plaintiff could have
substantially mitigated, if not eliminated, any  amages or loss
of pay she claims. In that regard, the Court will be asked to
consider whether the plaintiff's actions following the "hol "
decision, especially as her con uct affected the
nondiscrirninator   ecision not to repropose her for
partnership, were inconsistent with her obligation to mitigate
amages. The Cpurt will be aske  to consi er whether
plaintiff's actions in attempting to intimidate a partner of
her office were inconsistent with that obligation and were a
factor in  er not being reproposed by Office of Go ernment
Services. (Transcript of Trial at 387-89, 401, 411, 724;
Transcript of Post-Trial Argument at 49-50). 
VIII
CONCLUSION
This case is unusual because this Court previously
determined to render its judgment based upon a trial record
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